

# For whom the bill tolls: redistributive consequences of a monetary-fiscal stimulus\*

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## Abstract

During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments in the euro area sharply increased spending while the European Central Bank eased financing conditions. We use this episode to assess how such a concerted monetary-fiscal stimulus redistributes welfare between various age cohorts. Our assessment involves not only the income side of household balance sheets (mainly direct effects of transfers) but also the more obscure financing side that, to a substantial degree, occurred via indirect effects (with a prominent role of the inflation tax). Using a quantitative life-cycle model, and assuming that the deficit was partly unfunded by future taxes, we document that young households benefited from the stimulus, while middle-aged and older agents mainly paid the bill. Crucially, most welfare redistribution was due to indirect effects related to macroeconomic adjustment that resulted from the stimulus. As a consequence, even though all age cohorts received significant fiscal transfers, the welfare of some actually decreased.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Motivation and main results

The COVID-19 pandemic struck unexpectedly in early 2020. It brought havoc, death, and suffering. Fiscal authorities around the world faced sharply increasing bills and dramatically falling income. The former resulted mainly from ballooning healthcare expenditures and subsidies to struggling firms. The latter followed self-imposed restrictions of economic activity by citizens who feared the infection, as well as lockdowns imposed by governments that tried to flatten the infection curve and prevent the healthcare system from collapsing. In the euro area (on which this paper concentrates), these developments brought about fiscal deficits of 7% and 5.2% of GDP in 2020 and 2021, respectively.

The fiscal expansion was accompanied by a deep monetary easing. With interest rates close to the effective lower bound (ELB), this was implemented by the introduction of a new round of quantitative easing. The European Central Bank (ECB) initiated the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) with a total envelope for asset purchases of EUR 1,850 billion. This ultra-expansionary policy mix allowed the financing of necessary expenditures and kept the economy afloat. However, it also resulted in inflationary pressures. Inflation increased from 1.2% just before the pandemic outbreak in February 2020 to 5.9% in February 2022 before the unprovoked aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine made food and energy prices soar and blurred the picture by further fueling inflation.

In this paper we use these developments to assess how such a massive monetary-fiscal stimulus redistributes welfare across different age cohorts. The direct effects of fiscal policy distributed income to various groups of citizens in a relatively transparent way. Various categories of transfers and expenditures are well documented in the Eurostat statistics. What is much less transparent, and at the same time arguably much more interesting, is the redistribution that happened indirectly due to macroeconomic adjustment. By preventing a collapse in economic activity, the monetary-fiscal stimulus increased the incomes of workers and owners of capital. However, the unexpected inflation it generated hurt owners of nominal

assets (cash, bonds). As official taxes have not been increased, these groups are the most likely to have implicitly financed much of the fiscal expenditures by paying an inflation tax.

To study these effects in detail, we construct a business cycle model with life-cycle features, carefully calibrate it to reflect the main distributional features of the balance sheets of the euro area households, and then use it to assess the redistributive consequences of the pandemic programs. Such a framework allows us not only to look at the direct redistribution due to non-uniformly allocated spending between different age cohorts but also, crucially, to assess the obscure part of the redistribution that occurred indirectly via general equilibrium effects. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first such attempt (not only for the pandemic stimulus but also more broadly in the context of monetary-fiscal stimuli), and here we see our main contribution to the existing literature.

The aggregate implications of our analysis are not surprising: without the stimulus package, the pandemic recession would have been worse, and deflation would loom. However, while the expansion contributed to faster post-pandemic recovery, it also resulted in rising inflation, and these two broad developments affect different age cohorts differently. To assess the total redistributive effects of the monetary-fiscal expansion, we calculate the expected remaining lifetime welfare gain separately for each cohort. What do we find? Young European households benefited most from the stimulus as fiscal expenditures and improved labor market conditions supported their incomes. Moreover, the nominal asset holdings of the young are relatively small (or even negative), so they did not pay much of the inflation tax (mortgage holders gained in fact). Older generations, on the other hand, footed most of the bill. They benefited from transfers to firms and the related stock market appreciation. However, these gains did not outweigh losses from the inflation tax on nominal assets, as middle-aged and old households tend to own them in substantial amounts.

Our most important finding is, however, that most of the total redistribution associated with the monetary-fiscal expansion occurred via indirect (general equilibrium) channels related to labor market performance, surprise inflation, and stock market appreciation. For many cohorts, these effects actually determined the sign of the total welfare effect.

## 1.2 Monetary and fiscal policy during the pandemic

In this section, we discuss the monetary-fiscal stimulus of 2020-21. Let us start with fiscal expenditures. As is well known, governments in all euro area countries sharply increased spending without raising taxes. How expenditure was divided between government consumption and various types of transfers matters somewhat for the macroeconomic picture, and a lot for the income side of the redistribution. We use government expenditure statistics to calculate the increase in spending in five categories (government consumption as well as transfers to employees, households, firms and retirees). Leaving technicalities and the presentation of detailed results to section 3, let us now only report the total size of the stimulus packages, which we estimate at 4% of GDP in 2020 and 5.4% of GDP in 2021.

Now, let us move to monetary policy. With the macroeconomic picture griming in the Winter of 2020, the ECB launched a new asset-purchase program, the PEPP. In March 2020, the Governing Council decided to start asset purchases with a maximum volume of EUR 750 billion. This envelope was further increased in June and December 2020 to a total of EUR 1850 billion or almost 14% of GDP, of which EUR 1718 billion were ultimately used by March 2022, when net purchases were suspended. The PEPP was supposed to bring monetary accommodation by easing financing conditions for the private and public sectors (Lane, 2022).<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, virtually all newly issued public debt was acquired by the Eurosystem (ES), creating central bank reserves. At the same time, almost no traditional monetary policy reaction occurred. Interest rates were not lowered during the pandemic as they were already close to their effective lower bound. A monetary policy tightening started only in the second half of 2022. The ECB decided to keep PEPP related asset holdings and to reinvest all maturing principal payments at least until the end of 2024 (ECB, 2023). Figure 1 shows how all the main categories discussed above were evolving over the analyzed period.

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<sup>1</sup>Beyond attempting to ease policy on the aggregate, the ECB was also actively counteracting the financial fragmentation of the euro area (i.e. rising yields of certain countries government securities). This part of the story is, however, beyond the scope of our study, and we pay attention neither to this nor to the impact of the PEPP on avoiding a possible widespread panic in financial markets.

As is known from the literature (discussed in the next section), the macroeconomic effects of government spending crucially depend on the current and expected future reaction of monetary policy as well as on whether the resulting deficits are expected to be repaid by future fiscal tightening. In this context, it is important to note that, at the time the PEPP was introduced, expectations of monetary policy pointed towards a prolonged period of accommodation, accompanied by a decline in inflation expectations, while expectations of fiscal policy suggested that spending shocks were largely perceived as unfunded. In March 2020, EONIA forward rates declined below zero for a horizon of up to 20 years. The forecasts of primary fiscal balances declined sharply into negative territory in 2020, and surpluses were not forecasted even when this paper was written (see bottom row of Figure 1).

Based on the facts described above, our baseline modeling strategy assumes a fiscal expansion which is only partly funded by future tax increases<sup>2</sup> and is otherwise accommodated by a passive monetary policy reaction in the sense of Leeper (1991). It should be made clear that we think of the analyzed episode as a special feature of the pandemic times and not necessarily as an adequate approach to modeling monetary-fiscal policy interactions in other circumstances.

### **1.3 The related literature**

First, our work is related to a growing literature emphasizing the potential redistributive effects of monetary and fiscal policies. Using detailed micro-level data on income and consumption for U.S. households, Coibion et al. (2017) find that contractionary monetary policy increases inequality in labor earnings and total income. Dossche et al. (2021) document that a monetary policy easing has an inequality-reducing impact mainly by reducing unemployment among the poorest households. Lenza and Slačálek (2021) come to the same conclusion in their study of quantitative easing. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that unexpected inflation transfers resources from the old (typically the bondholders) to the young (with

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<sup>2</sup>As explained in detail in Section (3), we calibrate our baseline stimulus scenario so that approximately 40% of the deficit remains unfunded.

fixed-rate mortgage debt) in the postwar U.S. economy. Similar conclusions can also be drawn for other countries. For the OECD economies, the evidence is provided by Albanesi (2007), who demonstrates the positive relationship between inflation and income inequality. For the euro area, Adam and Zhu (2016) use the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) data to show that unexpected price level movements generate a quantitatively significant wealth redistribution. Pallotti et al. (2023) use the same data to measure the welfare effects of rising inflation between 2021 and 2022, identifying those aged 25-44 as net winners as they are less likely to own large balances of nominal assets and more often hold nominal debt. Heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) models are also increasingly gaining ground in the context of distributional effects, showing i.a. that poor households are more strongly affected by monetary policy shocks (see e.g., Kaplan et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2023).

Regarding distributional aspects of the pandemic fiscal stimulus, Faria-e Castro (2021) analyzes the effects of various policy tools on the incomes of household groups (borrowers vs. savers), while Bayer et al. (2023) use a HANK model to calculate the effectiveness of various transfers in stabilizing the economy. Closest to our work is Bhattarai et al. (2023), who analyze the distributional consequences of various fiscal tools and discuss the role of their inflationary consequences in a two-agent (Ricardian and hand-to-mouth) model. To the best of our knowledge, discussing the distributional consequences of fiscal policy along the age dimension, their direct vs. indirect component, and their dependence on the shape of monetary policy have not been studied so far.

Second, our paper is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, focusing on either the role played by monetary policy behavior or on how the fiscal stimulus is funded. The former concurs that the effects of fiscal policy are highly dependent on how monetary policy is shaped. In particular, changes in government spending or taxes and transfers may have more significant multiplier effects under zero lower-bound conditions compared to periods when there is more room to maneuver the interest

rates. Christiano et al. (2011) document that fiscal measures aimed at increasing aggregate demand are particularly powerful at the effective lower bound while Erceg and Linde (2014) consider the conditions under which they may even become self-financing. Similar results are obtained by Woodford (2011), showing an increase in welfare when government purchases help close the output gap created due to the inability to reduce interest rates. More generally, empirical evidence presented by Cloyne et al. (2020) emphasizes the crucial role of monetary policy in shaping the size of fiscal multipliers.

The other line of papers follows Leeper (1991) and Leeper and Leith (2016), who introduce the concept of an active fiscal - passive monetary policy arrangement under which fiscal deficits are accommodated by expansionary monetary policy. In this vein, Bianchi et al. (2023) introduce the distinction between funded and unfunded fiscal shocks, the latter not backed by future fiscal adjustments and consequently leading to a sharp increase in output and inflation. Focusing on the American Rescue Plan Act from 2021, that paper concludes that the program exacerbated the rise in inflation because it was partially unfunded. A related stream of literature shows similar effects of a money-financed fiscal expansion, which, as argued by Hall and Sargent (2022), was the key way of financing the US fiscal response to COVID-19. English et al. (2017) find that money-financed fiscal programs seen as credible by the public can strongly boost the economy. Galí (2020) shows that under not binding ELB, money-financed government initiatives give a more considerable boost to the economy than a debt-financed fiscal stimulus. Reis and Tenreyro (2022) discuss the impact of helicopter drops as a response to several economic shocks, including the redistribution of wealth across agents over time.

Last but not least, our work is also related to papers using an OLG setup with New Keynesian features, typically relying on the stylized Blanchard-Yaari framework. This literature includes, among others, Galí (2021) on rational bubbles, Del Negro et al. (2012) on resolving the forward guidance puzzle, Nisticó (2012) about stock prices in driving monetary policy, Eggertsson et al. (2019) on quantifying the secular stagnation hypothesis, Bielecki

et al. (2022) on the distributional consequences of monetary policy shocks and Angeletos et al. (2023) on the possibility of fiscal deficits becoming largely self-financing due to their expansionary effect on the tax base and inflation .

## 2 Model

We use a general equilibrium model with 80 cohorts of overlapping generations of households. The model features a New Keynesian production sector with sticky prices and wages, as well as a government, a central bank and a banking sector. Households are allowed to hold a rich set of assets and liabilities (deposits, loans, government bonds, housing and stocks). The government spends its income on several types of transfers as well as on government consumption. Below, we present the main building blocks of the model. The Appendix provides further details, including the complete set of aggregate equilibrium conditions. A period in the model corresponds to one year. Variables without time subscripts indicate their respective steady state values.

### 2.1 Households

#### 2.1.1 Demographics

We assume that households enter the labor market at the age of 20, which corresponds to index  $j = 1$  in our model, and live for a maximum of  $j = J = 80$  periods. In each period, they face age-dependent mortality risk with an age-specific probability denoted as  $\omega_j$ , with  $\omega_J = 1$ . The size of age cohort  $j$  in period  $t$  is denoted as  $N_{j,t}$ . It evolves according to the following formula

$$N_{j+1,t+1} = (1 - \omega_j)N_{j,t} \tag{1}$$

and the total population is given by

$$N_t = \sum_{j=1}^J N_{j,t} \tag{2}$$

We assume that the size of the youngest cohort  $N_{1,t}$  changes at a constant rate  $n$ . Since the age-specific survival probabilities do not change over time, each age cohort, and hence the total population, also grows at rate  $n$ .

### 2.1.2 Budget constraint

In each period, households decide on their consumption  $c_{j,t}$  and accumulation of the following four types of assets, all expressed in real terms: housing  $\chi_{j,t}$ , deposits  $m_{j,t}$  that yield nominal gross return  $R_t^m$ , financial assets  $a_{j,t}$  that are managed by investment funds<sup>3</sup> and that offer age-specific nominal gross return  $R_{j,t}^a$ , and an adjustable-rate mortgage loan  $s_{j,t}$  on which banks charge nominal gross interest  $R_t^\ell$ . Households also supply differentiated labor services  $h_{j,t}(\iota)$  to labor unions that pay real wage  $z_j w_t(\iota)$  net of tax at rate  $\tau$ , with  $\iota$  indexing individual households and  $z_j$  denoting age-specific productivity. Households can work until they reach retirement age  $J_R = 45$ , which is operationalized in the model by assuming that  $z_j = 0$  for  $j \geq J_R$ . Households can also receive four types of transfers:  $t_{j,t}^H$ ,  $t_{j,t}^W$ ,  $t_{j,t}^F$ , and  $t_{j,t}^R$ , which are extended to, respectively, all households, working households, firm owners, and retired households. Finally, households receive unintended bequests  $beq_{j,t}$ , which consist of assets left by other households that die before age  $J$  and are distributed evenly across cohorts no older than  $J_R - 10$ . Due to staggered wage contracts, household labor income can differ within a cohort. However, we assume that this idiosyncratic risk can be perfectly insured so that all other allocations chosen by agents in the same cohort are identical. This allows us to omit index  $\iota$  on these variables and write the budget constraint of cohort  $j$  as followse

$$c_{j,t} + p_{\chi,t}[\chi_{j,t} - (1 - \delta_\chi)\chi_{j-1,t-1}] + m_{j,t} + a_{j,t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^\ell}{\pi_t} s_{j-1,t-1} = (1 - \tau)w_t(\iota)z_j h_{j,t}(\iota) + \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{j-1,t-1} + \frac{R_{j,t}^a}{\pi_t} a_{j-1,t-1} + s_{j,t} + t_{j,t}^H + t_{j,t}^W + t_{j,t}^F + t_{j,t}^R + beq_{j,t} + \Xi_{j,t}(\iota) \quad (3)$$

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<sup>3</sup>In our model, households decide on the amount of total financial assets  $a_{j,t}$  they want to hold. These comprise real assets (claims on capital and firm profits) and nominal bonds. The shares of each are determined exogenously to match the asset profiles observed in the data. The portfolio is managed by investment funds, as explained later.

where  $p_\chi$  denotes the real price of housing,  $\delta_\chi$  is the annual depreciation rate of housing stock,  $\pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1}$  is the gross inflation rate (with  $P_t$  denoting the aggregate price level), and  $\Xi_{j,t}(\iota)$  stands for net real payments from the labor insurance scheme.

To ensure realistic dynamics of mortgage debt, we assume that housing loans are taken for multiple periods so that  $s_{j,t}$  evolves according to the following formula

$$s_{j,t} = \ell_{j,t} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) \frac{s_{j-1,t-1}}{\pi_t} \quad (4)$$

where  $\ell_{j,t}$  denotes new loans granted in period  $t$  to households of age  $j$  and  $m$  is a parameter controlling the effective loan duration. These loans are subject to the following loan-to-value (LTV) constraint

$$\ell_{j,t} \leq LTV_j \chi_{j,t} p_{\chi,t} \quad (5)$$

where  $LTV_j$  is the age-specific loan-to-value ratio.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.1.3 Wage stickiness

Differentiated labor services of variety  $\iota$  are sold to perfectly competitive aggregators who bundle labor from all households of age  $j$  according to the following formula

$$h_{j,t} = \left[ \int_0^1 (z_j h_{j,t}(\iota))^{1/\mu_w} d\iota \right]^{\mu_w} \quad (6)$$

where  $\mu_w$  determines the degree of substitutability between differentiated labor services. We assume that the thus defined effective bundles of labor services of different age cohorts are perfect substitutes, so aggregators are paid the same real wage  $w_t$  per unit of  $h_{j,t}$  for all  $j$ . Labor aggregators maximize the following objective function  $w_t h_{j,t} - \int_0^1 w_t(\iota) z_j h_{j,t}(\iota) d\iota$ .

Wage setting is performed by monopolistically competitive labor unions. For tractability, we assume that they operate on behalf of all households, implicitly aggregating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure over the whole working-age population.

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<sup>4</sup>We use the age-specific LTV ratio to pin-down households loan positions in the steady state. It can be rationalized as a shortcut for bank's varying willingness to grant loans to agents of various age.

Labor unions set wages subject to nominal rigidity a la Calvo, with reoptimization probability  $1 - \theta_w$ . Wages that are not reoptimized are indexed to steady state inflation.

### 2.1.4 Household optimization problem

In period  $t$  a household of age  $j$  solves the following problem

$$V_{j,t}(\mathcal{S}_{j-1,t-1}; \iota) = \max_{\{c_{j,t}, \ell_{j,t}, \chi_{j,t}, m_{j,t}, a_{j,t}, s_{j,t}, h_{j,t}(\iota)\}} \{u_{j,t}(\iota) + \beta \omega^j \mathbb{E}_t V_{j+1,t+1}(\mathcal{S}_{j,t}; \iota)\} \quad (7)$$

where the instantaneous utility function is given by

$$u_{j,t}(\iota) = (1 - \varrho) \log(c_{j,t} - \varrho \bar{c}_{j,t-1}) + \\ + v_j \log \chi_{j,t} + \psi_j \log m_{j,t} - \phi_j \frac{h_{j,t}(\iota)^{1+\frac{1}{\varphi}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\varphi}} + (1 - \varrho) \frac{g}{c_j} \log(g_t - \varrho g_{t-1}) \quad (8)$$

The state space of a household aged  $j$  in period  $t$  is  $\mathcal{S}_{j-1,t-1} = \{\chi_{j-1,t-1}, m_{j-1,t-j}, a_{j-1,t-1}, s_{j-1,t-j}, w_{t-1}(\iota)\}$ ,  $\beta$  denotes the discount factor,  $\varrho$  controls the degree of external habit formation,  $g_t$  is public consumption (assumed to be allocated equally across all households), and  $\bar{c}_{j,t}$  denotes per capita consumption of cohort  $j$ .<sup>5</sup> Note that the weight on the last term in the felicity function 8 ensures that the marginal utilities of private and public consumption are equal in the steady state. The optimization is subject to the sequence of budget constraints (3), collateral constraint (5), mortgage debt law of motion 4, and labor demand schedules implied by the solution to the problem of labor aggregators.

## 2.2 Firms

Our model features a standard New Keynesian firm sector. There are two stages of production. Final good producers combine differentiated inputs  $y_t(i)$  and produce a homogeneous

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<sup>5</sup>Naturally, we have  $\bar{c}_{j,t} = c_{j,t}$  in equilibrium.

final product  $y_t$  according to the following CES aggregator

$$y_t = \left[ \frac{1}{N_t^f} \int_0^{N_t^f} y_t(i)^{\frac{1}{\mu}} di \right]^\mu \quad (9)$$

where  $\mu$  determines the degree of substitutability between different product varieties and  $N_t^f$  is the number of intermediate inputs. Their objective is to maximize  $P_t y_t - \frac{1}{N_t^f} \int_0^{N_t^f} P_t(i) y_t(i) di$ , where  $P_t(i)$  is the price of intermediate input  $i$ . Risk-neutral intermediate goods producers rent capital  $k_t(i)$  and effective labor  $h_t(i)$  to produce differentiated products  $y_t(i)$  with the standard Cobb-Douglas technology

$$y_t(i) = k_t(i)^\alpha h_t(i)^{1-\alpha} - \Phi^F \quad (10)$$

which includes fixed cost  $\Phi^F$ . The profit of firm  $i$  is  $P_t(i)y_t(i) - W_t h_t(i) - R_{k,t} k_t(i)$ , where  $W_t$  is the nominal wage rate and  $R_{k,t}$  is the nominal rental rate on capital. The number of firms is such that the profits are zero in the steady state. Price setting by intermediate goods producers is subject to a Calvo rigidity. In each period, a fraction  $1 - \theta$  of firms receive a signal to reoptimize their prices, which otherwise are indexed to steady state inflation.

### 2.2.1 Capital goods produces

Perfectly competitive and risk-neutral capital goods producers purchase final goods  $i_t$  at price  $P_t$  and combine them with undepreciated capital subject to quadratic investment adjustment costs to produce new capital that can be operated in the next period. The economy-wide capital stock per capita hence evolves according to

$$(1 + n)k_t = (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + \left[ 1 - \frac{S_k}{2} \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] i_t \quad (11)$$

where  $S_k$  controls the degree of adjustment costs and  $\delta$  is the capital depreciation rate.

## 2.3 Financial sector

The financial sector consists of two types of intermediaries: banks, which extend mortgages to households and hold their deposits, and investment funds, which manage households' non-bank assets.

### 2.3.1 Investment funds

Perfectly competitive investment funds trade in government bonds and claims on physical capital. They invest the resources obtained from households and provide them with the return on an exogenously specified portfolio. We assume that fund managers are risk-neutral. Arbitrage then implies equalization of the expected rate of return on bonds and capital  $R_t = \mathbb{E}_t(R_{k,t+1} + (1 - \delta)Q_{t+1})/Q_t$ , where  $Q_t$  denotes the price of capital. Investment funds also receive dividend payments from firms and banks, which they distribute across households in a lump sum fashion and proportionally to their claims on capital. Denoting the share of bonds in the portfolio of cohort  $j$  as  $\eta_{j,t}$ , we can express the gross ex post age-specific nominal return on the portfolio for cohort  $j$  as:  $R_{j,t}^a = \eta_{j,t}R_{t-1} + (1 - \eta_{j,t})R_t^f$ , where  $R_t^f$  is the gross nominal return on real assets.

### 2.3.2 Banks

We model the banking sector in a simplified way. Rather than defining individual banks as profit-maximizing agents, we model them as licensed intermediaries. Each serves an assigned group of households, accepting all their deposits and offering any mortgages they demand. Banks also purchase government bonds that households are not willing to hold  $b_t^b$  and reserves issued by the central bank  $rr_t$ . The balance sheet of the consolidated banking sector is given by

$$m_t = rr_t + b_t^b + s_t \tag{12}$$

Since we abstract away from any defaults on mortgages and will further assume that reserves pay the same interest rate as bonds, all assets held by banks are perfect substitutes from their

perspective, which implies  $R_t^\ell = R_t$ . We also postulate the following simple rule transmitting  $R_t$  to the deposit rate  $R_t^m$ <sup>6</sup>

$$R_t^m = R^m + \iota_m(R_t - R) \quad (13)$$

where  $\iota_m$  determines the speed of the interest rate pass-through. The profits of the consolidated financial sector are given by

$$div_t^b = \frac{R_{t-1}}{\pi_t}(rr_{t-1} + b_{t-1}^b + s_{t-1}) - \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t}m_{t-1} - \Phi^B \quad (14)$$

and they are transferred to households, proportionally to their claims on capital.  $\Phi^B$  denotes fixed costs that ensures zero profits in the non-stochastic steady state.

## 2.4 Fiscal and monetary authorities

The government collects labor income taxes and issues debt  $b_t^g$  to finance exogenously given public consumption  $g_t$  and transfers to households. The government budget constraint is then given by:

$$\frac{R_{t-1}}{\pi_t}b_t^g + g_t + t_t^H + t_t^W + t_t^R + t_t^F = (1+n)b_{t+1}^g + \tau w_t h_t \quad (15)$$

The central bank can hold government bonds  $b_t^c$ , financing its purchases by issuing reserves  $rr_t$ . Its balance sheet constraint is then simply  $rr_t = b_t^c$ . Since we assume for simplicity that central bank reserves are remunerated at the same rate  $R_t$  as government bonds, the central bank makes zero profits period by period.

In line with the discussion provided in the introduction, we assume in our baseline model simulations that whenever a change in net fiscal revenues requires an adjustment in government debt (e.g., because of a fiscal stimulus package), all net issuance of government bonds is absorbed by the central bank, and bonds held by the private sector  $b_t$  remain constant in real terms. As we will see, such monetary policy conduct implies very limited responsiveness

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<sup>6</sup>A more elaborate version of the banking sector could feature an agency friction a la Gertler and Karadi (2011), which would drive an endogenous wedge between  $R_t^m$  and  $R_t$ .

of nominal interest rates to fiscal stimulus, making central bank actions passive in the sense of Leeper (1991).

## **2.5 Market clearing conditions**

The model is closed with a standard set of market clearing conditions relegated to the Appendix.

# **3 Calibration**

We calibrate our economy to the euro area. Since, in our model, one period corresponds to one year, we use annual data for calibration.

## **3.1 Demographics and life-cycle profiles**

From the Eurostat data, we obtain the age-dependent mortality risk as well as the growth rate of the population, using the averages from the 1999-2018 period and applying exponential extrapolation when data for the oldest cohorts are missing. The resulting population growth rate equals 0.1% annually. Together with the mortality rates, this pins down the stationary population structure.

We use the second wave of the HFCS data conducted in 18 euro area countries to obtain the age profiles for labor income, hours worked, housing wealth, real assets, loans, bonds, and deposit holding at the household level. Labor income consists of wage employment and self-employment, while hours worked equal time spent at the main job. Housing consists of the household's main residence and other real estate property not used for business activities. Real financial assets are the sum of the household's business wealth, the value of a non-self-employment private business, publicly traded shares, 50% of mutual fund holdings, and 50% of voluntary pension and life insurance contracts. Loans equal the value of mortgage and non-mortgage debt. Money holdings are matched to deposits. Government bond holdings

correspond to the sum of bonds and the remaining 50% of both mutual and voluntary pension funds. Table 3 presents the mapping between our categories and HFCS codes.

In order to match the steady state profile of labor income, we proceed as follows. First, we obtain the age profile of hourly wage from the HFCS, which directly pins down age-specific productivities  $z_j$ . Next, we plug them into the model and use the age-specific weights on disutility of labor  $\phi_j$  to match the profile of hours worked observed in the data. The age profile of housing and deposits is matched using the age-specific utility-weights  $v_j$  and  $\psi_j$ . The age profile of loans follows from the credit constraint of households and is matched to the data with age-specific loan-to-value ratios  $LTV_j$ . Finally, we impose the age profile of government bond holdings in the steady state from the data using exogenous weights  $\eta_j$ . The age profile of the remaining real assets is endogenous.

Figure 2 presents the age profiles of hours worked, labor productivity, and asset holdings together with raw data based on HFCS statistics. The labor productivity profile follows a standard pattern, it increases up to late middle age and then declines slightly. The age profile of hours worked is quite flat. Regarding assets, young households tend to finance their consumption and housing expenditures with loans. Therefore their net financial assets are negative. In middle age, households accumulate assets and decumulate them after retirement. The model is successful in capturing these broad features of the data.

Figure 3 plots the distribution of assets generated by the model. It is important to note that the profiles of some assets (in particular housing) are less steep than those of others (in particular real financial assets). Consequently, their accumulation / decumulation speed differs, which, as explained in section 5, is an important driver of the redistributive effects.

### **3.2 Macroeconomic parameters and steady-state ratios**

We set the discount factor  $\beta$  to 0.9876 to match the steady state real interest rate of 0.8 percent, which is the euro area average from the period of 1997-2012, when the effective lower bound did not constrain the ECB monetary policy. As is standard in the macroeconomic literature, we set the Frisch elasticity to 0.5. The habit persistence parameter  $\varrho$  is calibrated

at 0.32, corresponding to a conventional value of 0.75 used in models operating at a quarterly frequency. The curvature of the investment adjustment cost  $S_k$  is set to 4. The steady state price and wage mark-ups both equal 1.2. Furthermore, we set the Calvo probability of price change  $\theta$  to 0.19 and of wage change  $\theta_w$  to 0.41. They correspond to, respectively, 0.66 and 0.8 at a quarterly frequency and imply price duration of, respectively, 3 and 5 quarters. All these values are well within the range of estimates in the literature.

We match the share of different asset holdings to GDP using national accounts data and aggregate balance sheet statistics of financial and non-financial assets (Eurostat data). The housing depreciation rate  $\delta_\chi$  equals 0.04 to match the housing-to-GDP ratio 1.3. We set the capital depreciation rate  $\delta$  and capital share in output  $\alpha$  to match the investment rate of 24 percent and the capital-to-GDP ratio of 1.97. The weights on the utility of deposits  $\phi_j$  and the loan-to-value ratios  $LTV_j$  imply the deposits-to-GDP ratio of 0.98 and the loans-to-GDP ratio of 0.87. Both are very close to the combined holdings of non-financial firms and households. The total supply of government bonds is set to 54 percent of GDP, which is the average of two statistics: holdings of government securities by households (50%) and the debt securities issued by the general government net of government debt holdings of the rest of the world (58 percent). The share of government expenditure to GDP is 20 percent, and the steady state inflation (inflation target) is 2 percent. The debt maturity parameter  $m$  is calibrated at 6.75 years based on averaged ECB data from the 30 months preceding the pandemic outbreak. It reflects the stock-to-flow ratio of lending for house purchases, excluding revolving loans and overdrafts for households in the euro area.

### **3.3 The fiscal stimulus**

We introduce the fiscal stimulus in the form of exogenous shocks to the five government spending categories shown in equation (15). In order to determine the size of the shocks, we analyze in detail Eurostat statistics on the total general government expenditures by function. These consist of 11 expenditure categories based on the European System of Accounts (ESA2010) and 70 functions classified according to the Classification of the Functions of

Government (COFOG1999). A detailed description of how the data was constructed can be found in the Appendix.

According to our estimates that we report in Table 1, the increase in total government spending in 2020 amounted to 4 percent of GDP, of which wage subsidies (2.08 pp) and government consumption (1.03 pp) consumed the lion's share. The total number for 2021 was 5.4% of GDP and had a similar composition across the five categories as in 2020.

As explained in Section 2, our baseline modeling approach assumes that the stimulus was only partly funded by future tax increases while the rest was accommodated by passive monetary policy. The exact proportion in which the stimulus-related fiscal deficits were backed up by future surpluses is an open issue but an important choice for our simulations. We take a conservative stance by assuming that the share of unfunded expenditures equals the difference between the stimulus size relative to GDP and the actual increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio observed through 2023. Given the absence of primary surpluses in the post-pandemic period (see Figure 1), this difference provides a lower bound estimate of the portion of debt that has been inflated away. Thus, we arrive at the unfunded share of the stimulus package equal to 40%. Consequently, in our simulations we additionally impose taxes on all households, spread over a period of 10 years<sup>7</sup>, so that with the endogenous increase in labor income tax revenue, 60% of the initial fiscal package ends up being funded.

It should be noted that our assumption regarding the unfunded part of the stimulus can be considered conservative, especially when compared with cross-country regressions presented by Barro and Bianchi (2023). Their analysis suggests that, across OECD countries, 40-50% of government spending was unfunded. However, since in their calculations both tax revenue and the real interest rate are held constant, their estimates can be considered a lower bound for the actual share of unfunded deficits.

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<sup>7</sup>We start taxing households in period 5 of our simulation, which corresponds to 2024 in the data. While the 10-year horizon is clearly arbitrary, the impact of this assumption on the results is small compared with the role of the share of unfunded deficits.

## 4 Macroeconomic effects of the pandemic stimulus

### 4.1 How does the model work?

Before using the model to simulate the pandemic, we present how our model economy reacts to the key ingredients of the fiscal programs used in most European countries during the pandemic. Our focus here is on how these programs transmit when combined with a high degree of monetary accommodation, so we assume for a moment that the government does not credibly commit to fiscal consolidation further down the road. We examine the transmission of two selected policies, namely, an increase in government consumption and an increase in transfers to households. In the latter case, we use transfers uniformly distributed across all living individuals. However, their aggregate implications (but not redistributive ones, which we cover in the next section) are very similar to those associated with transfers targeting firm owners, workers, or retirees.

Figure 4 plots the responses to a one-period increase in government consumption equal to 1% of steady state GDP. One striking result is that output expands by more than the applied stimulus, so the impact multiplier is above unity, amounting to about 1.2. As economic activity stays elevated for the following years, the cumulative multipliers are even larger, reaching 1.9 after eight years.<sup>8</sup> It is because neither private consumption nor investment are crowded out but instead persistently expand as monetary policy accommodates increased fiscal spending by purchasing bonds issued by the government. The real amount of reserves the central bank creates to finance these purchases is lower than the size of the stimulus, as inflation erodes the real value of public debt and increases labor income tax revenue. As a result, the financing gap that the fiscal authority needs to bridge by additional bond issuance is much less than 1 percent of GDP. The magnitude of monetary accommodation can also be appreciated by noting that the nominal interest rates barely change despite persistently higher inflation. As a result, the real interest rate remains negative for an extended time.

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<sup>8</sup>Here and below, the cumulative multipliers are calculated as the discounted sum of the changes in output divided by the initial increase in a given spending category, where the discounting uses the household discount factor  $\beta$ .

This, along with higher tax revenues, allows the fiscal authority to gradually bring the real stock of public debt back to its steady state level. The mirror image of this deleveraging process is a fall in central bank reserves issued to finance government bond purchases. Finally, low interest rates appreciate asset prices, including the prices of homes.

Very similar dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates can be observed in response to a one-period increase in transfers to households, again normalized to 1% of GDP. As depicted in Figure 5, the key difference compared to the government consumption shock is a much lower impact response of output. This reflects the intertemporal consumption smoothing motive by households, who choose not to immediately spend all of the additional transfer income on purchases of more goods. As a result, the impact multiplier is much lower and amounts to about 0.3, but accumulates to 1.4 after eight years. Otherwise, the economy absorbs the transfer shock in a very similar way as it does in the case of a government consumption shock, thus stressing the key role of monetary accommodation provided by a passive central bank.

The presented results are broadly in line with the empirical literature estimating the dynamic effects of fiscal surprises, and in particular with most recent works showing that fiscal multipliers can be as high as two or even three if monetary policy is very accommodative (Cloyne et al., 2020; Hack et al., 2023).<sup>9</sup> Our model simulations are also consistent with those papers that find crowding-in of both private consumption and non-residential investment by an exogenous increase in government spending (see, e.g., Fritsche et al., 2021).

## 4.2 Simulating the pandemic stimulus

We now use the model to simulate the effects of the whole fiscal package. As explained in Section 3.3, we now assume that, two years after the stimulus and for the period of ten years, the government levies additional taxes on households such that only 40% of the total stimulus ends up being unfunded.

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<sup>9</sup>In this context, it is important to distinguish these two papers that focus on the causal effect of monetary policy stance from studies showing large fiscal multipliers when the economy is at the zero lower bound (e.g., Ramey and Zubairy, 2018), the latter case being endogenous to the business cycle.

Figure 6 presents the impact on key macroeconomic variables. From Table 1, recall that the stimulus was worth almost 10% of pre-pandemic annual GDP and was spread relatively evenly over two years. According to our model, the impact on economic activity was sizable, elevating GDP about 3% above its steady state level during the first two years. These expansionary effects were also long-lasting, with GDP remaining about 1% above the steady state four years after the stimulus was withdrawn. The economic expansion was driven by both public and private consumption, the latter supported by massive transfers to households, but investment also contributed significantly. The fiscal expansion is accommodated by the monetary authority, which issued reserves worth about 6% of GDP in the second year of the stimulus to purchase government debt. As a result, inflation increased by a bit more than 2% and stayed elevated for five years. Persistently negative real interest rates led to a boom in asset prices and an expansion in credit.

Naturally, the stimulus in Europe was not implemented in a vacuum. It was launched in response to a massive collapse in economic activity and deflationary pressures caused by global supply disruptions, social distancing measures implemented by the authorities to contain the pandemic, and a spike in economic uncertainty. Therefore, it is instructive to set our simulation results against the backdrop of actual macroeconomic developments in the euro area. Figure 7 shows the evolution of EA inflation and GDP growth, comparing them to a counterfactual scenario that assumes no stimulus. Clearly the package prevented an even deeper contraction in economic activity and helped avoid deflation. However, it also contributed positively to the inflation surge observed two years later, adding about 0.7 percentage points to the increase in HICP observed in 2022.

## 5 Redistributive effects

In our life-cycle model, households are heterogeneous because of age. This determines the type and quantity of income they earn and the type and stock of assets they hold. As we have seen from Table 1, the pandemic fiscal package in the euro area involved various types

of transfers, some of which were directed to particular groups, namely workers, retirees, or firm owners. Given the size and non-uniform distribution of transfers across the population, one can expect that these direct effects alone could result in non-negligible redistribution of wealth. However, as we will now show, indirect effects associated with adjustments in macroeconomic quantities, prices, and asset returns were even more important and, hence, crucial to assess the redistributive consequences of the stimulus across different age cohorts.

We first offer a crude assessment of the direct effects of the fiscal package, obtained simply by allocating each of its five components presented in Table 1 to the relevant population groups. More specifically, we assume that transfers to firms are allocated to individual households proportionally to their equity (claims on capital) holdings, wage subsidies and transfers to retirees are allocated equally across all working and retired persons, respectively, while general transfers to households and public consumption are distributed uniformly across all households. Figure 8 presents the outcomes, expressed in percent of cohort-specific steady state consumption. According to this measure, all households benefited from the stimulus, with the biggest gains accruing to those in their early 60s. This is because these age cohorts hold much of their wealth in equity, hence being ultimate recipients of transfers to firms, and are still in the working age, hence receiving more money than older agents as the fiscal package featured higher wage subsidies per worker than per beneficiary transfers to retirees.

Naturally, the picture painted by direct effects is only too rosy as it omits the financing side of the stimulus and the macroeconomic adjustments it generates. In a microfounded model like ours, the appropriate summary metric of who eventually gains and who loses from a policy is household welfare. We present this in Figure 9, also breaking down the total welfare effect into the contributions of the five fiscal instruments used in the stimulus. The outcomes starkly contrast to those arising from the direct effects alone (shown as dashed line). Most importantly, not all cohorts gain, only those below 50 in the year when the stimulus was implemented, so it clearly redistributed wealth from older to younger generations. The magnitude of this redistribution is sizable, with the biggest winners gaining about 12% of their annual consumption while those hurt most losing roughly half of that.

The main element of the fiscal expansion that contributed to this redistribution was wage subsidies (transfers to employees). Interestingly, not all the workforce benefited from this part of the program as its impact harmed cohorts in their late 40s. The impact of government consumption is less pronounced but follows a strikingly similar pattern, turning from positive to negative for agents in the late 40s, even though we assumed these two types of expenditures to be uniformly allocated to all people. Similarly, while general transfers to households (net of lump sum taxes) are allocated equally to all households, they end up redistributing welfare from younger to older generations. It has to be noted that this category is actually negative in present value terms as it includes the future increase in taxation used for fiscal consolidation. Not surprisingly, transfers to retirees generated welfare gains for people past their retirement age. Interestingly, however, they also benefited much younger households a bit, at the expense of middle-aged ones. Finally, transfers to firms generated welfare gains mainly for households in their 70s as they own most of capital. However, this part of the stimulus turned out to have a detrimental effect on older cohorts while bringing some benefits to younger agents.

To understand what drives these results, it is instructive to use a welfare decomposition developed by Bielecki et al. (2022). See Appendix C for detailed derivations and adaptations to our particular model. In a nutshell, this decomposition takes an individual household's perspective. It breaks down the total welfare effects into contributions associated with all macroeconomic aggregates and prices that show up in a given household's utility and budget constraint. The results of such a decomposition are presented in Figure 10.

The main force distributing wealth from the older to the younger generation is changes in the return on nominal assets. The stimulus led to a surge in inflation, which benefited agents with short positions in nominal assets and hurt those holding long positions. In our model (recall Figure 3), and in line with the data, loans are predominantly taken out by younger agents, while bond and money holdings are accumulated more gradually, peaking around or after retirement age. As a result, this channel of the fiscal stimulus improved the welfare of younger workers and deteriorated the welfare of those nearing or in retirement.

Quantitatively the effect is much larger for older cohorts since they hold a significant amount of nominal assets. At the retirement age, the ratio of nominal assets to consumption equals 435%. At the same time, nominal asset holdings, while negative, are much smaller (in absolute value) in the case of younger individuals. The ratio of nominal liabilities to consumption at the age of 30 equals approximately 116%. Another channel through which younger and middle-aged cohorts benefited is the labor market, as the economic expansion generated by the fiscal stimulus pushed labor demand and, hence, workers' income up.

These two effects were, to some extent, offset by changes in the return on real assets. As the stimulus and its monetary accommodation drove equity prices up, agents holding them gained significantly. This applies, in particular, to older households who tend to run down their claims on capital after retiring, hence benefiting from elevated prices. In contrast, younger households who are still in the process of accumulating real financial assets lost as this accumulation became more costly when equity prices rose. For similar reasons, changes in house prices also redistributed wealth from younger to older generations, but the effects were much smaller than those associated with real assets. This is because the age profile for housing (see again Figure 3) is not very steep, meaning that changes in house prices do not dramatically affect the cost of housing accumulation.

All four channels through which the stimulus affects household welfare work through prices, returns on assets, and wages. Hence, they can be characterized as indirect effects in the language of Kaplan et al. (2018). The direct effects, shown in Figure 10 as net transfers and public consumption, contribute significantly and (in line with the discussion above) always positively. However, they matter relatively little for intergenerational redistribution.<sup>10</sup> As a matter of fact, accounting for the indirect effects completely changes the assessment of who won and who lost from the pandemic fiscal stimulus in the euro area. Judging by the direct effects alone, the biggest winners were households around 60. However, they actually belong to the group of biggest losers when all effects are considered.

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<sup>10</sup>The magnitude, but not so much the general direction of the redistribution, is affected by the external habit formation, which reduces the welfare gains perceived by those cohorts that evaluate their higher consumption relative to the increased consumption of the preceding generation.

Let us stress that our findings should be treated as purely normative. We do not aim to draw any positive conclusions about whether the fiscal-monetary stimulus should have had redistributive effects, as this is beyond the scope of the paper. First, this assessment depends on specific policy objectives related to addressing inequality. Second, such an evaluation would require a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic environment, particularly the redistributive effects of the underlying macroeconomic shocks that monetary and fiscal policies are responding to. We leave these important issues for further research.

## 6 Counterfactual assumptions and model validation

As discussed in Section 1.3, fiscal policy's impact on the economy strongly depends on whether the stimulus is funded or unfunded, how monetary policy reacts to the expansion, and how the public perceives the monetary-fiscal mix further down the road. In Section 1.2, we explained why our baseline scenario assumes a passive monetary - active fiscal policy arrangement under which the stimulus remains partly unfunded. In this section we demonstrate how the redistribution would look like under two alternative (counterfactual) assumptions. Then we present an additional exercise which allows to validate the baseline and alternative scenarios against the data.

Our two alternative scenarios are meant to help understand how specific assumptions about the monetary-fiscal arrangement affect redistribution. First, we assume a much higher share of debt being unfunded. To be specific, we assume away the fiscal consolidation that was embedded in the baseline scenario. This leaves us with over 60% of the deficit unfunded (the rest is financed via the labor income tax). The second experiment assumes that the whole stimulus is funded by taxes or, in other words that fiscal policy is passive. In this simulation transfers to households are adjusted endogenously so that public debt is eventually stabilized at the steady state level.<sup>11</sup> As is known from Leeper (1991) such an arrangement requires an active monetary policy. Accordingly, we assume that it follows a standard Taylor-type rule

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<sup>11</sup>In order to highlight the role of intermediate factors (and not of tax collection) we assume a very low speed of tax adjustment in the fiscal rule.

with smoothing

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left( \frac{R_{t-1}}{R} \right)^{\gamma_R} \left[ \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right)^{\gamma_\pi} \left( \frac{y_t}{y} \right)^{\gamma_y} \right]^{1-\gamma_R} \quad (16)$$

The highly counterfactual character of this simulation should be clearly stated. First, monetary policy reacts immediately to counter the inflationary consequences of the stimulus. Second, fiscal policy begins consolidating the budget. Third, agents anticipate a full coverage of the deficits by taxes (which makes their reactions close to Ricardian). In light of the evidence discussed in Section 1.2, these assumptions were clearly not fulfilled.

Figure 11 plots the macroeconomic outcomes under these alternative assumptions against our baseline scenario. The alternatives differ clearly. In particular, the effects become stronger when a larger share of the stimulus is unfunded and smaller if the stimulus is funded and monetary policy becomes active. Importantly, this affects the developments also during the pandemic years, as all scenarios are fully anticipated. In particular, inflation peaks at 3.4% in the unfunded scenario and 0.5% under active monetary policy instead of 2.2% under the baseline.

How would this affect the redistribution? This is evidenced in Figures 12 and 13. Without fiscal consolidation, the role of the return on nominal assets increases. This is an obvious consequence of inflation reacting much more to the stimulus, so that, in particular, the inflation tax paid by older cohorts is larger. Gains from labor income are also bigger as output increases by more. The net outcome is that the gains of the younger and the losses of the older households are more pronounced. So are the general conclusions that younger cohorts benefit at the expense of older generations and that indirect effects matter a lot.

An active monetary - passive fiscal policy arrangement would affect the redistribution in the opposite direction. As the impact on inflation is much smaller, the losses incurred by owners of nominal assets become negligible. As a result total welfare is similar to its direct component for all cohorts. In other words active monetary policy and full fiscal consolidation reduce the general equilibrium channel of redistribution. The figure shows also that the

welfare consequences for all cohorts are positive. This particular finding should, however not be regarded as general, as it results from the assumption that taxes are collected far in the future, thus partly affecting cohorts that have not yet been born.

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Given the key role of inflation in welfare redistribution, it is useful to compare our model implications for this variable to its actual path observed in the euro area. This poses a challenge as inflation has been heavily influenced by other severe shocks that we do not model: lockdowns, supply-chain bottlenecks, or the energy price shock of 2022. As a result, a direct comparison of the inflation path from the model to the data would be highly misleading. However, the pandemic shocks turned out to be transient and have fully dissipated at the moment this paper was written (2024). Energy prices reverted to a substantial degree as well, but their impact on prices might not have completely vanished. Luckily, Banbura et al. (2023) calculated a counterfactual core inflation rate in the euro area cleaned of the impact of supply-chain pressures and energy price shocks. According to their estimates, by the end of 2024 the counterfactual price level was 4.4% above the pre-pandemic trend.<sup>12</sup> These developments fit very well with our baseline model simulation, according to which the price level after five years is 4.4% higher compared to what it would have been absent the stimulus. The alternative assumptions presented in this section lead to substantially higher or lower price increases (8.6% for the scenario without fiscal consolidation and only 1% in the case of active monetary policy) which corroborates their counterfactual characters.

## 7 Conclusions

Monetary and fiscal authorities in the euro area reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic with a massive stimulus. Over two years, additional debt-financed fiscal spending amounted to

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<sup>12</sup>We calculate cumulative inflation rates from 2020 to 2024 using counterfactual estimates from Banbura et al. (2023) available until May 2024. For the rest of 2024 we use the latest available ECB core inflation forecast. From these observations we subtract the trend core inflation from the decade 2010-2019, which is 1.3%. We thank Marta Bańbura for providing us with the counterfactual inflation estimates.

almost 10% of pre-pandemic GDP. The European Central Bank reacted with a new round of quantitative easing worth almost 14% of GDP. This paper seeks to find out how such a monetary-fiscal stimulus redistributed welfare and, in particular, who paid the bill, as official taxes have not been raised. To this end, we constructed a life-cycle model with nominal frictions and calibrated it to match the main features of the income and asset distribution across the euro area age cohorts. Then, we simulated the fiscal programs introduced during the pandemic and used the model to estimate their implications for the macroeconomy and welfare redistribution between various age cohorts.

According to our results, young European households benefited from the monetary-fiscal stimulus, while middle-aged and older households mainly paid the bill. Importantly, most redistributive effects of the stimulus did not come from direct income effects of increased spending (as it was divided relatively evenly across different age cohorts) but from its indirect macroeconomic effects associated with changes in asset returns and labor market conditions, of which inflation played the dominant role by hurting households with large nominal assets holdings. In fact, for many cohorts, these indirect effects turned the overall welfare impact of the stimulus negative.

The pandemic stimulus and the degree of monetary accommodation were unprecedented in recent European history. For this reason, its aggregate and redistributive effects may not necessarily be representative for other fiscal expansions, especially those conducted in normal times. However, we do believe that properly accounting for the indirect effects of such programs is key to identifying their winners and losers. As our analysis clearly shows, the outcome of such an evaluation can be very different from what one would expect just by looking at direct income flows.

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## Tables and figures

Table 1: Change in government expenditure

<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>
Transfers to employees	2.08	2.07
Government consumption	1.03	1.46
Transfers to firms	0.45	0.89
Transfers to retirees	0.34	0.40
Transfers to all households	0.13	0.53
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.03</b>	<b>5.44</b>


**Note:** The values are expressed in % of GDP in 2019; the increase is in percentage points relative to the 2019 level.

Table 2: Calibrated structural parameters

Parameter	Value	Description
$\beta$	0.9875	Discount factor
$\varphi$	0.5	Frisch elasticity of labor supply
$\varrho$	0.32	Habit persistence
$\delta_\chi$	0.04	Housing depreciation rate
$\delta$	0.12	Capital depreciation rate
$\alpha$	0.25	Capital share in output
$S_k$	4	Investment adjustment cost curvature
$\mu$	1.2	Steady state product markup
$\theta$	0.19	Calvo probability (prices)
$\Phi$	0.04	Intermediate goods producers fixed cost
$\mu_w$	1.2	Steady state wage markup
$\theta_w$	0.41	Calvo probability (wages)
$g_y$	0.2	Share of government purchases in GDP
$b^g/y$	0.54	Steady state government bonds to GDP ratio
$m$	6.75	Debt maturity
$\gamma_R$	0.41	Interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule
$\gamma_\pi$	1.25	Reaction to inflation in the Taylor rule
$\gamma_y$	0.25	Reaction to GDP in the Taylor rule


Figure 1: Development of main economic and financial variables

General government debt (EUR mn)




Source: Eurostat

Eurosystem holdings of government securities (EUR mn)




Source: ECB

Reserves of euro area credit institutions (EUR mn)




Source: ECB

ECB interest rate (main refinancing operations, %)




Source: ECB

Government primary balance (% GDP) - IMF projections 2019 - 2023




Source: IMF

EONIA forward curve (%)




Source: ECB

Figure 2: Model-based profiles vs. the data



**Note:** The average values of age profiles are normalized to unity. Crosses stand for raw HFCS data adjusted by household size and aggregated by cohorts, lines show profiles from the model.

Figure 3: Asset structure



**Note:** The figure presents the distribution of assets and net worth generated by the model. The average net worth across cohorts has been normalized to unity.

Figure 4: Impulse responses to a government consumption shock




Figure 5: Impulse responses to a transfer to households shock




Figure 6: Aggregate effects of the pandemic stimulus




Figure 7: Data and counterfactual scenario (w/o stimulus)






Figure 8: Fiscal transfers by age cohort




**Note:** The cohort age in 2020 is on the horizontal axis, and transfers in % of steady state consumption are on the vertical axis. The figure presents only pandemic-time transfers and does not account for taxes related to the fiscal consolidation.

Figure 9: Welfare effects of the pandemic stimulus - decomposition by stimulus sources (baseline scenario)




**Note:** The cohort age in 2020 is on the horizontal axis, and welfare gains in % of steady state consumption are on the vertical axis. Effect of transfers and direct effects are presented net of taxes related to the fiscal consolidation.

Figure 10: Welfare effects of the pandemic stimulus - decomposition by income channels (baseline scenario)




**Note:** The cohort age in 2020 is on the horizontal axis, and welfare gains in % of steady state consumption are on the vertical axis. Effect of transfers and direct effects are presented net of taxes related to the fiscal consolidation.

Figure 11: Macroeconomic effects of alternative assumptions




**Note:** The figure plots the macroeconomic impact of two alternative assumptions about future fiscal/monetary policy. The first one assumes no reversal of the fiscal stimulus, and the second an active monetary policy.

Figure 12: Welfare effects of an unfunded stimulus



**Note:** The cohort age in 2020 is on the horizontal axis, and welfare gains in % of steady state consumption are on the vertical axis. We assume that no fiscal consolidation follows in the future.

Figure 13: Welfare effects under fully funded stimulus and active monetary policy



Note: The cohort age in 2020 is on the horizontal axis, and welfare gains in % of steady state consumption are on the vertical axis. We assume that the government adjusts taxes to fully repay the debt, while the central bank follows a Taylor rule. Transfers and direct effects are presented net of taxes related to the fiscal consolidation.

## Appendix A: Model equations

Below we present the list of equations making up the model.

### Demography

$$N_{1,t+1} = (1 + n)N_{1,t} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

$$N_{j+1,t+1} = (1 - \omega_j)N_{j,t} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$N_t = \sum_{j=1}^J N_{j,t} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

### Households

Budget constraint

$$\begin{aligned} c_{j,t} + p_{\chi,t}[\chi_{j,t} - (1 - \delta_{\chi})\chi_{j-1,t-1}] + m_{j,t} + a_{j,t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^{\ell}}{\pi_t} s_{j-1,t-1} = \\ = (1 - \tau_t)w_t z_j h_{j,t} + s_{j,t} + t_{j,t}^H + t_{j,t}^W + t_{j,t}^R + t_{j,t}^F + \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{j-1,t-1} + \frac{R_{j,t}^a}{\pi_t} a_{j-1,t-1} + beq_{j,t} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$s_{j,t} = \ell_{j,t} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) \frac{s_{j-1,t-1}}{\pi_t} \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$\ell_{j,t} = LTV_j \chi_{j,t} p_{\chi,t} \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$a_{J,t} = 0 \quad (\text{A.7})$$

First order conditions

$$u_{j,t}^c = \frac{1 - \varrho}{c_{j,t} - \varrho c_{j,t-1}} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$1 = \beta(1 - \omega_j) \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{u_{j+1,t+1}^c}{u_{j,t}^c} \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$\frac{v_j}{1 - \varrho} \frac{1}{\chi_{j,t}} = u_{j,t}^c p_{\chi,t} - \beta(1 - \omega_j)(1 - \delta_H) \mathbb{E}_t \left[ u_{j+1,t+1}^c \frac{p_{\chi,t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.10})$$

$$\frac{\psi_j}{1 - \varrho} \frac{1}{m_{j,t}} = u_{j,t}^c - \beta(1 - \omega_j) \mathbb{E}_t \left[ u_{j+1,t+1}^c \frac{R_t^m}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.11})$$

### Wage setting

$$h_{j,t} = \left( \frac{(1 - \tau_t) z_j w_t}{\phi_j \mu_w} \frac{1 - \varrho}{c_{j,t} - \varrho \bar{c}_{j,t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} \Delta_{w,t} \quad (\text{A.12})$$

$$w_t = \left[ \theta_w \left( w_{t-1} \frac{\pi}{\pi_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu_w}} + (1 - \theta_w) (\tilde{w}_t)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu_w}} \right]^{1-\mu_w} \quad (\text{A.13})$$

$$\tilde{w}_t = \mu_w \frac{\Omega_{w,t}}{\Upsilon_{w,t}} \quad (\text{A.14})$$

$$\Omega_{w,t} = \tilde{\phi} \left( \frac{w_t}{\tilde{w}_t} \right)^{\frac{\mu_w}{\mu_w-1}(1+\varphi)} (h_t)^{1+\varphi} + \tilde{\beta} \theta_w \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{\mu_w}{1-\mu_w}(1+\sigma_n)} \Omega_{w,t+1} \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_{t+1}}{\tilde{w}_t} \right)^{\frac{\mu_w}{\mu_w-1}(1+\sigma_n)} \right] \quad (\text{A.15})$$

$$\Upsilon_{w,t} = \tilde{\lambda}_t \left( \frac{w_t}{\tilde{w}_t} \right)^{\frac{\mu_w}{\mu_w-1}} h_t + \tilde{\beta} \theta_w \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu_w}} \Upsilon_{w,t+1} \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_{t+1}}{\tilde{w}_t} \right)^{\frac{\mu_w}{\mu_w-1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.16})$$

where

$$\tilde{\beta} = \beta \sum_{j=1}^{JR-1} \frac{N_{j+1,t+1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{JR-1} N_{i,t}} \quad (\text{A.17})$$

$$\tilde{\lambda}_t = \sum_{j=1}^{JR-1} u_{j,t}^c \frac{N_{j+1,t+1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{JR-1} N_{i,t}} \quad (\text{A.18})$$

### Aggregation

$$c_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} c_{j,t}}{N_t} \quad (\text{A.19})$$

$$h_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} z_j h_{j,t}}{N_t} \quad (\text{A.20})$$

$$\chi_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} \chi_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.21})$$

$$m_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} m_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.22})$$

$$a_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} a_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.23})$$

$$l_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} \ell_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.24})$$

$$s_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} s_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.25})$$

$$b_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{N_{j,t} b_{j,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \quad (\text{A.26})$$

$$\begin{aligned} beq_t = & \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{[N_{j-1,t-1} - N_{j,t}(1+n)]}{N_t(1+n)} \left( (1 - \delta_\chi) p_{\chi,t} \chi_{j,t} + \frac{R_{j,t}^a}{\pi_t} a_{j,t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{j,t} - \frac{R_{t-1}^\ell}{\pi_t} s_{j,t} \right) \\ & + \frac{N_{J,t}}{N_t(1+n)} \left( (1 - \delta_\chi) p_{\chi,t} \chi_{J,t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{J,t} - \frac{R_{t-1}^\ell}{\pi_t} s_{J,t} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.27})$$

## Financial Intermediaries

$$q_t = E_t \left[ \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{q_t} (r_{t+1}^k + (1 - \delta) q_{t+1}) \right] \quad (\text{A.28})$$

$$a_t = b_t + [q_t(1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + i_t]/(1+n) \quad (\text{A.29})$$

$$\frac{R_t^f}{\pi_t} (a_{t-1} - b_{t-1}) = (r_t^k + (1 - \delta)q)k_{t-1} + div_t + div_t^b \quad (\text{A.30})$$

$$R_{j,t}^a = \eta_{j,t} R_{t-1} + (1 - \eta_{j,t}) R_t^f \quad (\text{A.31})$$

$$\eta_{j,t} = \frac{b_{j-1,t-1}}{a_{j-1,t-1}} \quad (\text{A.32})$$

$$b_{j,t} = b_j \quad (\text{A.33})$$

$$m_t = rr_t + b_t^b + s_t \quad (\text{A.34})$$

$$R_t^m = R^m + \iota_m (R_t - R) \quad (\text{A.35})$$

$$R_t^\ell = R_t \quad (\text{A.36})$$

$$div_t^b = \frac{R_{t-1}}{\pi_t} (rr_{t-1} + b_{t-1}^b + s_{t-1}) - \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{t-1} - \Phi^B \quad (\text{A.37})$$

## Firms

Producers of goods

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha)mc_t k_t^\alpha h_t^{-\alpha} \quad (\text{A.38})$$

$$r_t^k = \alpha mc_t k_t^{\alpha-1} h_t^{1-\alpha} \quad (\text{A.39})$$

$$div_t = y - w_t h_t - r_t^k k_t \quad (\text{A.40})$$

$$1 = \theta \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu}} + (1 - \theta) \left( \tilde{P}_t \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu}} \quad (\text{A.41})$$

$$\Delta_t = (1 - \theta) \tilde{P}_t^{\frac{\mu}{1-\mu}} + \theta \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_t} \right)^{\frac{\mu}{1-\mu}} \Delta_{t-1} \quad (\text{A.42})$$

$$\tilde{P}_t = \mu \frac{\Omega_t}{\Upsilon_t} \quad (\text{A.43})$$

$$\Omega_t = mc_t y_t + \theta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{R_t} \right) \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{\mu}{1-\mu}} \Omega_{t+1} \right] \quad (\text{A.44})$$

$$\Upsilon_t = y_t + \theta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{R_t} \right) \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu}} \Upsilon_{t+1} \right] \quad (\text{A.45})$$

Producers of capital

$$(1 + n)k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + \left[ 1 - \frac{S_k}{2} \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] i_t \quad (\text{A.46})$$

$$1 = q_t \left[ 1 - \frac{S_k}{2} \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 - S_k \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right] + E_t \left[ q_{t+1} \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{R_t} S_k \left( \frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} \right)^2 \right] \quad (\text{A.47})$$

## Government

Government budget constraint

$$\frac{R_{t-1}}{\pi_t} b_{t-1}^g + g_t + t_t^H + t_t^W + t_t^R + t_t^F = (1 + n)b_t^g + \tau_t w_t h_t \quad (\text{A.48})$$

Fiscal and monetary policy

$$b_t^g = b_y y \quad (\text{A.49})$$

$$rr_t = b_t^c \quad (\text{A.50})$$

## Market clearing

$$y_t \Delta_t = k_{t-1}^\alpha h_t^{1-\alpha} - \Phi^F \quad (\text{A.51})$$

$$\chi_t = \chi \quad (\text{A.52})$$

$$y_t = c_t + i_t + \delta_\chi p_{\chi,t} \chi + g_t + \Phi^B \quad (\text{A.53})$$

$$b_t^g = b_t + b_t^b + b_t^c \quad (\text{A.54})$$

## Exogenous variables

The following variables are exogenous:  $g_t$ ,  $t_t^H$ ,  $t_t^W$ ,  $t_t^R$ ,  $t_t^F$ .

## Appendix B: Calibration of the model and the fiscal scenario

Below, we explain how we calibrated the distributional aspects of the model and the fiscal scenario.

The distributional features of the model were calibrated on the basis of the Household Finance Consumption Survey data (Ganoulis et al., 2016). Since aggregate quantities of various types of assets obtained from this dataset deviate from the national account statistics (see e.g., Hammer, 2015), we calibrate the standard macroeconomic parameters and match the key aggregate steady state proportions, including those describing the aggregate asset structure, based on the national accounts data. The age profiles, however, are taken from the HFCS. The link between model categories and HFCS codes can be found in Table 3.

Table 3: Mapping between model categories and the codes from the HFCS

Category in the paper	HFCS name	HFCS code
Labor income	= Employee income	DI1100
	+ Self-employment income	DI1200
Hours worked	= Hours working a week - main job	PE0600
Housing stock	= Value of household's main residence	DA1110
	+ Value of other real estate property not for business activities	DA1122
Real financial assets	= Business wealth	DA1200
	+ Value of non self-employment private business	DA2104
	+ Shares, publicly traded	DA2105
	+ 50% Mutual funds	DA2102
	+ 50% Voluntary pension/whole life insurance	DA2109
Nominal financial assets	+ = Bonds	DA2103
	+ 50% Mutual funds	DA2102
	+ 50% Voluntary pension/whole life insurance	DA2109
Deposits	= Deposits	DA2101
Loans	= Outstanding balance of mortgage debt	DL1100
	+ Outstanding balance of other, non-mortgage debt	DL1200

Regarding the fiscal scenario, we consider five types of fiscal expenditures:

- wage subsidy covering the expenses for unemployment and various labor affairs as well as the excess compensation for employees from the public sector;
- government consumption, including mainly investments and intermediate consumption;
- transfers to firms, consisting of subsidies and capital injections targeted at service and manufacturing industries;
- transfers to retirees targeted at the oldest;
- transfers to households providing medical care and countering social exclusion.

A detailed classification of expenditure categories and functions is listed in Table 4.

Next, the sum of expenditures for each category was deflated (CPI) and expressed as a percent of GDP in 2019. The values of fiscal shocks are presented in Table 1.

Table 4: Categories and functions of government expenditure to calibrate the growth of government expenditure in the simulation

Expenditure	National accounts indicator	Functions
Wage subsidy	Capital transfers	General economic, commercial and labor affairs
	Compensation of employees	General services; Hospital services; Outpatient services; Police services; Pre-primary and primary education; Secondary education; Tertiary education; Unemployment
	Other current transfers	General economic, commercial and labor affairs
	Social benefits other than social transfers in kind	Unemployment
	Subsidies	General economic, commercial and labor affairs
Government consumption	Capital transfers	Foreign economic aid; Public health services
	Gross capital formation	General services; Hospital services; Medical products, appliances and equipment; Military defense Secondary education; Transport
	Intermediate consumption	Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs; Health (not elsewhere classified); Hospital services; Military defense; Other industries; Outpatient services; Public health services; Social exclusion (not elsewhere classified)
	Other current transfers	Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs; Foreign economic aid
	Social benefits other than social transfers in kind	Family and children; Sickness and disability; Social exclusion (not elsewhere classified); Survivors
Transfer to firms	Capital transfers	Economic affairs (not elsewhere classified); Fuel and energy; Hospital services; Housing development; Mining, manufacturing and construction; Other industries; Transport
	Subsidies	Fuel and energy; Hospital services; Mining, manufacturing and construction; Other industries; Outpatient services; Pollution abatement; R&D Economic affairs; Sickness and disability; Transport
Transfer to retirees	Social benefits other than social transfers in kind	Old age
	Subsidies	Old age
Transfer to households	Other current transfers	Family and children; Social exclusion (not elsewhere classified)
	Social transfers in kind - purchased market production	Hospital services; Medical products, appliances and equipment; Outpatient services; Public health services

**Note:** Expenditure categories are based on the European System of Accounts (ESA2010), while their functions are classified according to the Classification of the functions of government (COFOG1999). Data comes from Eurostat from the table on General government expenditure by function.

## Appendix C: Welfare decomposition

In this appendix, we derive the decomposition of welfare effects by economic channels, as shown in Bielecki et al. (2022). Let us start by formally defining an indirect utility function of a  $j$ -aged household  $\iota$ , as follows

$$\mathcal{W}_{j,t}(\iota) = \max \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} \left[ \begin{aligned} & (1 - \varrho) \log (c_{j+s,t+s} - \varrho \bar{c}_{j+s,t+s-1}) - \phi_{j+s} \frac{h_{j+s,t+s}(\iota)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \\ & + \psi_{j+s} \log m_{j+s,t+s} + v_{j+s} \log \chi_{j+s,t+s} \\ & + \frac{g}{c_{j+s}} (1 - \varrho) \log (g_{t+s} - \varrho g_{t+s-1}) \end{aligned} \right] \quad (\text{A.55})$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} & c_{j,t} + p_{\chi,t} [\chi_{j,t} - (1 - \delta_\chi) \chi_{j-1,t-1}] + m_{j,t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^\ell}{\pi_t} s_{j-1,t-1} + a_{j,t} = \\ & = (1 - \tau_t) w_t z_j h_{j,t}(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu_w}} h_{j,t}^{\frac{\mu_w-1}{\mu_w}} + t_{j,t}^H + t_{j,t}^W + t_{j,t}^F + t_{j,t}^R \\ & + \frac{R_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t} m_{j-1,t-1} + s_{j,t} + \left( \eta_{j,t} \frac{R_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + (1 - \eta_{j,t}) \frac{R_t^f}{\pi_t} \right) a_{j-1,t-1} + beq_{j,t} + \Xi_{j,t}(\iota) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.56})$$

where, compared to the budget constraint (3), we used the equilibrium demand condition for individual labor variety implied by aggregation (6) to eliminate  $w_t(\iota)$  and omitted the collateral constraint (5) as it is slack in equilibrium. Indirect utility (A.55) is a function of (current and expected sequences of) house prices  $p_{\chi,t}$ , return on nominal assets  $R_{t-1}/\pi_t$ , return on equity  $R_t^f/\pi_t$ , return on money  $R_{t-1}^m/\pi_t$ , return on loans  $R_{t-1}^\ell/\pi_t$ , aggregate wage rate  $w_t$ , labor income tax rate  $\tau_t$ , cohort-specific bequests  $beq_{j,t}$ , transfers  $t_{j,t}^H$ ,  $t_{j,t}^W$ ,  $t_{j,t}^F$ ,  $t_{j,t}^R$ , as well as cohort-specific labor  $h_{j,t}$  and consumption  $\bar{c}_{j,t-1}$ .

Suppose that at time  $t = 0$ , the economy is hit by a shock. Then, up to the first order of approximation, the effects of this shock on household welfare can be decomposed into the contributions of the above-listed thirteen arguments of indirect utility using its total derivative

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota) = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial p_{\chi,s}} dp_{\chi,s} + \dots \quad (\text{A.57})$$

Let us denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of cohort  $j$  as  $\lambda_{j,t}$ , sum of bequests and insurance payments as  $bi_{j,t}(\iota) = beq_{j,t} + \Xi_{j,t}(\iota)$ , the ex post real rates of return

on assets  $r_t \equiv R_{t-1}/\pi_t - 1$ ,  $r_t^f \equiv R_t^f/\pi_t - 1$ ,  $r_t^m \equiv R_{t-1}^m/\pi_t - 1$  and  $r_t^\ell \equiv R_{t-1}^\ell/\pi_t - 1$ , and the  $s$ -years ahead survival rate  $\omega_{j,t+1}^s \equiv \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}}$ . Then we can work out all the individual components in (A.57), using the envelope theorem and taking the non-stochastic steady state as the approximation point, as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial p_{\chi,s}} dp_{\chi,s} &= - \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \lambda_{j+s} [\chi_{j+s} - (1 - \delta_\chi) \chi_{j+s-1}] dp_{\chi,s} \\ &= - \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^s \omega_j^s u_{j+s}^c [\chi_{j+s} - (1 - \delta_\chi) \chi_{j+s-1}] dp_{\chi,s} \\ &= u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} [(1 - \delta_\chi) \chi_{j+s-1} - \chi_{j+s}] dp_{\chi,s} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.58})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial r_s} dr_s = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} \eta_{j+s} a_{j+s} dr_s \quad (\text{A.59})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial r_s^f} dr_s^f = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} (1 - \eta_{j+s}) a_{j+s} dr_s^f \quad (\text{A.60})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial r_s^m} dr_s^m = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} m_{j+s} dr_s^m \quad (\text{A.61})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial r_s^\ell} dr_s^\ell = -u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} \ell_{j+s} dr_s^\ell \quad (\text{A.62})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial w_s} dw_s = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} (1 - \tau) z_{j+s} h_{j+s}(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu_w} - 1} h_{j+s}^{\frac{\mu_w - 1}{\mu_w}} dw_s \quad (\text{A.63})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial h_{j+s,s}} dh_{j+s,s} = \frac{\mu_w - 1}{\mu_w} u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} (1 - \tau) w z_{j+s} h_{j+s}(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu_w} - 1} h_{j+s}^{-\frac{1}{\mu_w}} dh_{j+s,s} \quad (\text{A.64})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial \tau_s} d\tau_s = -u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} w z_{j+s} h_{j+s}(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu_w} - 1} h_{j+s}^{\frac{\mu_w - 1}{\mu_w}} d\tau_s \quad (\text{A.65})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial bi_{j+s,s}} dbi_{j+s,s}(\iota) = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} dbi_{j+s,s}(\iota) \quad (\text{A.66})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial t_{j+s,s}^H} dt_{j+s,s}^H = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} dt_{j+s,s}^H \quad (\text{A.67})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial t_{j+s,s}^W} dt_{j+s,s}^W = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} dt_{j+s,s}^W \quad (\text{A.68})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial t_{j+s,s}^F} dt_{j+s,s}^F = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} dt_{j+s,s}^F \quad (\text{A.69})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial t_{j+s,s}^R} dt_{j+s,s}^R = u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} dt_{j+s,s}^R \quad (\text{A.70})$$

$$\sum_{s=1}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial \bar{c}_{j+s,s-1}} d\bar{c}_{j+s,s-1} = -\varrho \sum_{s=1}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} u_{j+s}^c d\bar{c}_{j+s,s-1} \quad (\text{A.71})$$

$$\sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota)}{\partial g_s} dg_s = \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} u_{j+s}^c (dg_s - \varrho dg_{s-1}) \quad (\text{A.72})$$

where we used the steady state relationship between the marginal utilities of various cohorts implied by the Euler equations, i.e.  $u_j^c = \beta^s \omega_j^s (1+r)^s u_{j+s}^c$  for  $0 \leq s \leq J-j$ .

Let us now define the welfare effect on an average (“representative”)  $j$ -aged household as

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \int_0^1 d\mathcal{W}_{j,0}(\iota) d\iota \quad (\text{A.73})$$

Then, using the definition of total labor input (6), the equilibrium result  $\bar{c}_{j,t} = c_{j,t}$ , as well as  $\int_0^1 \Xi_t(\iota) d\iota = 0$  so that  $\int_0^1 b_{i,j,t}(\iota) d\iota = beq_{j,t}$ , we can write (up to first order approximation)

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \Gamma_j^X + \Gamma_j^{nom} + \Gamma_j^f + \Gamma_j^w + \Gamma_j^g + \Gamma_j^t + \Gamma_j^{hab} + \Gamma_j^{other} \quad (\text{A.74})$$

where

$$\Gamma_j^X = -\mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} [\chi_{j+s+1} - (1-\delta_\chi)\chi_{j+s}] dp_{\chi,s} \quad (\text{A.75})$$

$$\Gamma_j^{nom} = \mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} \left[ \eta_{j+s} a_{j+s} dr_s + m_{j+s} dr_s^m - \ell_{j+s} dr_s^\ell \right] \quad (\text{A.76})$$

$$\Gamma_j^f = \mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} (1-\eta_{j+s}) a_{j+s} dr_s^f \quad (\text{A.77})$$

$$\Gamma_j^w = \mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} z_{j+s} \left[ (1-\tau) h_{j+s} dw_s + \frac{\mu_w - 1}{\mu_w} (1-\tau) w dh_{j+s,s} - w h_{j+s} d\tau_s \right] \quad (\text{A.78})$$

$$\Gamma_j^g = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} u_{j+s}^c (dg_s - \varrho dg_{s-1}) \quad (\text{A.79})$$

$$\Gamma_j^t = \mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} [dt_{j+s,s}^H + dt_{j+s,s}^R + dt_{j+s,s}^W + dt_{j+s,s}^F] \quad (\text{A.80})$$

$$\Gamma_j^{hab} = -\varrho \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{s=1}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} u_{j+s}^c dc_{j+s,s-1} \quad (\text{A.81})$$

and where  $\Gamma_j^{other}$  captures the effect of bequests and higher-order terms. This is the decomposition that we use in the main text and depict in Figure 10.